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More than just data and information 
The HFA indicator 1 in priority action 3, requires that critical information about disaster risk 
be accessible to all relevant stakeholders. This is clearly very important, albeit not enough, 
as will be discussed in this paper. It may be useful to start with an example that tackles one 
important source of information at both international and national levels, that is disaster 
damage databases. The debate on the value and the comparability of those databases is 
currently led by the European Commission. The latter initiative, open to relevant 
international stakeholders such as FEMA and UNISDR, has fostered a process of analysis and 
reflection mirrored in the JRC Report “Recording disaster losses” (De Groeve et al., 2013). 
The stake is revising the way current databases are developed, fed and used by a variety of 
actors, given the general dissatisfaction with the sometimes low data quality, low sources 
reliability, lack of consistency when comparing data from different databases. The need to go 
much beyond “data” to be able to improve the current situation and also, more 
fundamentally, to motivate countries to develop better national databases is a key point 
arising from the debate. The purpose for which disaster losses data are recorded need to be 
identified and known before field surveys. In fact, as suggested by Jennex (2009) whilst data 
and information are clearly the bricks of knowledge, you need knowledge to search for the 
right data and information. In the JRC report it is suggested that disaster losses data are 
needed for three different purposes: accounting, forensics, and risk assessment.  
Whilst the first is already accomplished by existing databases, the other two require a much 
deeper consideration. It is recognized very clearly and to a certain extent this is a novelty, 
that in order to improve pre-event risk assessments, that is in order to improve the capacity 
to forecast expected damage for the future, a better understanding of what occurred in past-
event is crucial. Both pre- and post-event damage estimates require that a clear definition of 
what needs to be considered as a damage, for and by whom, what types of damage are to 
be estimated, at what scales be univocally determined.  
In the meantime, post-event damage assessment should not be limited to an account of 
numbers and description of losses, rather they should permit also to explain why damage 
has occurred. “Forensics”, in line with the IRDR (2011) research line, refers to the analytical 
explanatory capacity to distinguish what component of damage is attributable to hazard, 
exposure, and/or different vulnerabilities factors.  
The idea that before collecting data the problem at stake must have been understood, at 
least at an initial level, and framed is nothing new; however it has been a common 
complaint, particularly in the last decades, that the tremendous capacity provided by 
technological fixes has induced a much broader search and manipulation of data, often 
without the necessary care about methodological rigour. Along all phases of the so called 
disaster cycle, a relevant amount of data is available, however many times crucial 
information is missing, incomplete, or provided in inconsistent form.  
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The case of disaster losses database provides an important example of the need to move 
forward, from the collection and organization of data to the concept of knowledge 
management systems. The Know-4-drr project does not aim at developing a full knowledge 
management system, but rather to explore the concept and to provide a framework for 
Box.1. Definition of data, information and knowledge 
Based on Davenport and Prusak’s (2005) discussion, the following classification can be proposed: 
Data: is a “fact”, an individual event; “in general it can be said that there is no meaning in data”. 
As an example: for the risk assessment, the data used is often a digital terrain model, rainfall 
data, data on historic flood events. “Data describes only a part of what happened, it provides no 
judgement or interpretation and no sustainable basis of action”. 
Information: “is a message, in the form of a document, audible or visible communication”. In 
fact, in Latin it means: provide with form, with a shape. Unlike data, information has a meaning. 
Davenport goes on suggesting that there are 5 ways in which data can be transformed into 
information: 
-Contextualized; 
-Categorized, 
-Calculated, 
-Connected, 
-Condensed. 
The outcome of the risk assessment is information in the form of vulnerability, hazard and risk 
maps, tables and reports. This information must then be transferred to the users and decision-
makers, making use of appropriate communication channels.  
Knowledge: according to Davenport, “knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, 
contextual information, and expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and 
incorporating new experiences and information. Knowledge can be seen as both process and 
stock”. There are many ways in which knowledge is created, some imply: 
- Comparison; 
- Consequence identification; 
- Creating connections; 
- Conversation. 
To achieve prevention and mitigation, the output from risk assessments is used to understand 
where the high risk areas are and what are the best mitigation measures - either through 
technical measures (engineering works) or organisational measures (e.g. urban planning). 
Created knowledge can be partial or unsatisfactory, because for example it does not include 
relevant aspects, such as vulnerability assessments. Knowledge limited to the hazard factors 
provide less options in terms of actions that can be taken. 
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eventually building it in the future. Knowledge management systems have been introduced 
in the business sector as a tool to deal with stratified, articulated knowledge regarding the 
activities, processes, requirements, market analyses, etc. in a given firm (Alavi and Leidner, 
2001). Such tools have been designed having in mind a varied set of goals, ranging from 
providing utilities for workers to retrieve relevant knowledge and information when needed, 
to storing acquired knowledge, to provide newcomers with an introduction to what has been 
achieved by workers of older generations. Knowledge management systems are considered 
as necessary in a fast evolving, increasingly complex and uncertain world.  
A knowledge management system is much more than a database or an information system; 
in order to fully grasp the idea behind it, light should be shed on some relevant aspects and 
definitions. First, a workable and working definition of knowledge is needed. It condenses 
some of the infinite and inevitably never ending discussions about knowledge in a form that 
serves the purpose of learning and maintaining crucial knowledge and information when 
crucial decisions have to be made regarding risks and crises. In this line, Zeleny (2006) 
stated that «Knowledge is embodied in an organism (or social organism) and embedded in 
action. Knowledge is not information. Information is a description of action. As an input, 
information contributes to the product of knowledge (action). The value of both knowledge 
and information is measured by the added value of their joint product. Knowledge produces 
value directly through action, while information contributes to its production as one of the 
inputs.» 
Without doubt, the increasing specialisation of scientific knowledge has led to intellectual and 
technological advancements in the domains of DRR and CCA. Scientific assessments – such 
as the Assessment Reports and the new Special Report on disaster risks of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) – contributed to an increased understanding of the 
factors that lead to adverse effects. However, it became clear that in the process of estab-
lishing climate change as a global phenomenon, knowledge should not be detached from 
meaning. Climate facts arise from impersonal observation whereas meanings emerge from 
embedded experience (Hulme 2009; Jasanoff 2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 1 : The “knowledge pyramid” 
DATA
INFORMATION
KNOWLEDGE
WISDOM
6 
 
The neat distinction carried out by Zeleny between information and knowledge echoes the 
debate initiated by Ackoff in 1989 regarding the “knowledge pyramid”, that organizes data, 
information, knowledge and wisdom in a hierarchical framework (figure 1). The initial idea 
has been revisited and reinterpreted by authors who suggested to break its rigidity, 
recognizing that there are many feedback loops in the data-information-knowledge 
“pyramid” (Davenport and Prusak, 2005; Frické, 2007; Jennex, 2009).Yet, the clear cut 
distinction between what can be intended as data, information, and knowledge is important 
in this discussion (see box 1).    
The opportunity to propose knowledge management systems in the field  disaster risk is not 
new either, albeit much more recent (Seneviratne, 2010; Dorasamy et al., 2013). UN Spider 
(UN-Spider, 2013), for example, has developed a web platform offering several utilities and 
access to relevant knowledge sources in the field of satellite imagery used for emergency 
management and crisis mapping (http://www.un-spider.org/).  
A fundamental difference exists between knowledge management systems for businesses 
and for organizations dealing with disaster risk reduction. In the former, the context within 
which the system must be developed is clearly defined, as the organisation’s goals are 
succeeding in a given market, making profit and guaranteeing continuity in a competitive 
and uncertain environment. The case of organizations and stakeholders dealing with disaster 
risk reduction, or who have and/or can play a relevant role in making society more robust, 
resilient and adaptive to hazards including climate change, is rather different. First because 
of the multiplicity of organizations, agencies, entities, some private some public that are on 
the scene. Because at the very end any citizen may play a relevant role in preventing and 
coping with extreme events outcomes. Second, even restricting the consideration to the 
organizations that have a mandated role in DRR and CCA, still goals and aims may not 
coincide and even conflict in certain cases. Probably, as will be discussed in the final section, 
one has to be clear in defining what knowledge management system, for what 
organization(s), with what specific purpose, has to be developed. 
In clarifying the context within which knowledge regarding disasters, the way to reduce, 
prevent and coping with them, a crucial aspect is to identify who are the key actors to be 
considered in such endeavour. 
Actors and stakeholders who may be interested in developing 
knowledge management system in DRR 
As correctly stated by Merad et al. (2013), defining an actor implies that there is an observer 
who identifies who plays a role and who does not in a given context. This is one of the 
complexity inherent in the Know-4-drr project: it is not a project about knowledge in the field 
of natural hazards, risks, and climate change; it is a project about what we understand and 
know about the knowledge that is “available” or not, that should be managed (or not) 
differently from the way it is currently. This meta level constitutes its main challenge, as a 
reflection about who is producing knowledge, how, what knowledge is produced and shared 
are the core questions to be analysed. 
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In the initial project description, it was proposed to consider four main groups whose 
knowledge is relevant for DRR and CCA: scientists, the public and the private sectors, and 
the “civil society” at large. 
Each group has been analysed in detail in the first deliverables of the project. 
Scientists  
The 2013 Report of the UNISDR Scientific and Technical Advisory Group (Southgate et al., 
2013), after selecting the definition of science as ‘knowledge obtained through study or 
practice’, considers that for disaster risk reduction (DRR), ‘... scientific capacities must be 
interpreted broadly to include all relevant matters of a scientific and technical nature, where 
science is considered in its widest sense to include the natural, environmental, social, 
economic, health and engineering sciences ...’.  
The increasing specialization of scientific knowledge while resulting in great intellectual and 
technological advance, also leads to increasing fragmentation.  
Main issues our society is facing today, like DRR and CCA, cannot be addressed by single-
discipline approaches due to its complex nature. Understanding issues such as e.g., DRR, 
CCA, biodiversity loss, food security, or sustainable development, requires input and 
expertise from a wide range of disciplines that span both the natural and social sciences. 
This integrated view, involving disparate disciplines, demands collaboration from problem 
formulation through hypothesis development, data analysis, interpretation, and application 
(Eigenbrode et al., 2007). These issues are essentially ‘systems’ problems (Nicolson et al., 
2002). Effectively addressing systems-problems requires bridging perspectives and 
disciplines and dealing with complex interacting processes that operate at different temporal 
and spatial scales. Because collaboration is becoming so prevalent in many issues/problems 
of today’s societies the concept of ‘disciplines’ turn to be outmoded, i.e., administrative 
artifacts; as stated by Léle´and Norgaard (2005): ‘when approaching collaborative work 
between scientists, forget disciplines; think scientific communities’. 
Progress has been made with regard to define trans-disciplinarity, to understand the differing 
ontologies, epistemologies, and methodologies, and to facilitate co-operation among 
disciplines and with non-academic knowledge holders (Hirsch Hadorn et al. 2008, Pohl 
2011).  
Public sector organizations  
Organisations and institutions from the public sector play a prominent role in dealing with 
natural hazards across all phases of the so called “disaster cycle”, starting from the 
mitigation in the pre-impact phase, to emergency and crisis management, to recovery an 
reconstruction. An increasing number of agencies and organizations are mandated of risk 
mitigation and disaster response at different scales, starting from the United Nations and the 
European Commission as far as international organizations are concerned, to national, 
regional and provincial levels, down to the local one. The public sector is responsible for 
providing the capacity to prevent and cope with disaster events by ensuring the necessary 
availability of means, resources, and infrastructure. Public sector’s organizations are 
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generally mandated to implement risk mitigation strategies and measures by directives, 
norms, legislation, that prescribe the scope and the limits of their intervention. Given the fact 
that providing safety and implementing mitigation measures are very challenging tasks, 
involving several organizations and agencies, the scope and limits of each one of the latter is 
not easy to define. This is the reason why some authors (May and Williams, 1986; Comfort, 
1999) prefer to speak about shared responsibility, and the need to coordinate and 
cooperate, exactly as already discussed for scientists, is essential for achieving any 
meaningful result. 
Private sector 
Reported  disaster losses carried by the private sector, e.g. due to damaged assets, or due 
to the disruption of business processes, are huge.  In addition, disasters directly or indirectly 
affect business performance and undermine longer-term competitiveness and sustainability 
(GAR13, pp.iv). Even though awareness of businesses’ vulnerability to disasters and to 
climate change consequences is still low, their contribution in DRR mainly through 
partnerships can be categorised as: a. companies managing or owing critical infrastructures, 
b. advocacy and awareness raising, c. social investment and philanthropic, and d. core 
business (see also UNISDR, Private Sector Activities in Disaster Risk Reduction: Good 
practices and lessons learned, 2008). 
a. The case of companies managing critical infrastructures is somehow in between 
public and private sectors. In fact, for many decades critical infrastructures have been run 
under a regime of monopoly in the majority of countries. Deregulation and privatization 
trends, particularly since the Nineties, have broken such regime, even though not totally or 
not completely. What is recognized in any case is that even where services or networks are 
privatized, the service is considered as public and requires therefore specific regulations and 
control by public/state authorities so as to guarantee its reliability, continuity and safety 
(Menoni et al., 2013). 
b. The private sector is an increasingly active producers of information regarding risks, 
hazards, and mitigation measures in advocacy and raising awareness campaigns. Web based 
companies for example are using the potential of the internet to make relevant information 
fast shared during emergencies; GIS developers are greed to provide open maps and 
mapping platforms for helping in logistics during crises. Private companies have been active 
though also in awareness raising campaigns, as testified by  UNISDR (2003) and examples in 
GAR 13. 
c. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) provides a good basis for business participation 
in disaster risk reduction. Especially for multinational companies, DRR is an increasingly 
important field of corporate social responsibility initiatives (UNISDR, 2008).  There are many 
types and characteristics of CSR (ILO 2011, Twigg 2001): donations and grants in cash or in 
kind (goods, services, facilities) to other organisations and groups or directly to beneficiaries, 
contracting other organisations or groups to carry out work for public benefit, sponsorships, 
information and awareness raising activities, participation in committees and discussion 
groups.   
d. Insurers have a relevant direct and indirect role in risk management, as insurance is 
considered as an important risk transfer mechanisms in both DRR and CCA. Particularly 
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reinsurers have an important role in knowledge management, as they produce risk 
assessments at the micro, meso, and large scales. However, generally insurers and 
reinsurers are reluctant to make their data public, for a variety of reasons, generating a 
mistrust regarding their willingness to share risk knowledge sources. The other stakeholders 
groups also expect (re)insurers to have much better and extensive loss and risk data than is 
actually the case. Insurance and reinsurance companies are active sponsors of hazards and 
risks research.  Sponsorship is an unequal partnership because the sponsor controls the 
funds and therefore the agenda.  Research funded by insurers is on topics relevant to the 
industry and hence more relevant to developed countries where insurance cover is more 
extensive (Twigg, 2002). According to GAR2013 “A growing convergence between the 
insurance and risk modelling companies, governments and the international community, 
promises to deliver new risk information platforms that will inform investment decisions by 
governments, businesses and cities alike. The fact that those companies developing new 
tools for visualising and managing disaster risks see a key business opportunity is a potent 
sign of change.” 
Civil Society 
Civil society is a heavily debated term in social sciences nowadays. In general, the term 
refers to the social sphere that is distinct from the state and the private sector, and this is 
why it is also referred to as the “third sector”. In this respect, civil society is said to be 
comprised of the so-called “intermediary institutions” such as NGOs, professional 
associations, labour unions, advocacy organizations or religious groups. The MacMillan 
Dictionary views civil society as the social groups that lay between the state and the family. 
Others consider the family to be part of the civil society, the latter also including associations 
(where voluntarism is a key element), social movements and forms of public communication 
(Cohen and Arato, 1992). The reason behind the scientific community’s acknowledgement of 
the role that the civil society plays is that voluntary or non profit organizations are playing a 
very important role in disaster mitigation which not only responds to the affected local 
communities’ urgent needs but also offers a balance vis-à-vis government shortcomings in 
dealing with mitigation. Last but not least, civil society’s involvement in DRR is also said to 
be important because of the specific role of knowledge is possesses. In many cases, 
traditional or local knowledge is said to be highly important in both mitigation and 
preparedness issues due to its contextualized nature. The degree to which civil society 
agents can collaborate with either the government or the private sector is of critical 
importance. Murphy (2007) argues that local government and community initiatives are 
interdependent (although they are separate) and that they may contradict one another, 
challenging the effectiveness of the total mitigation effort. 
It was already acknowledged in the project proposal that this broad classification is neither 
exhaustive nor satisfactory. For example, scientists cannot be viewed as detached from the 
other groups. In fact scientists are working for both private and public institutions. In some 
cases they are also contracted by citizens’ groups and NGO to provide an alternative 
perspective to “official” science on particularly controversial issues.  
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Each group is actually comprised by a myriad of organizations, social groups, individuals, 
that are not always pursuing the same goals, that are not necessarily sharing a uniform 
perspective about what has to be done to mitigate and respond to hazards and disasters.  
Different organizations individuals, agencies, businesses, are not equally empowered nor 
equally able to produce and enact knowledge regarding disaster risk and climate change 
adaptation and prevention.  
The roles of experts as mediators of knowledge has grown rapidly. As scientists expanded 
their role as consultants and advisers concerning policy and society, the scientific advisory 
process became so pervasive and influential that Jasanoff (1990) has called it “the fifth 
branch”. By merging legal and institutional analysis with social studies of science, she 
challenges the conventional assumptions that science guaranteed truth and that science 
experts’ advice was unbiased, fail-safe, and thus indispensible to policy-making: how can 
scientists ensure the objectivity of science and “how can they maintain their authority as 
neutral experts, especially when challenged in the media or the courts?” (ibid. 1990, p. 9). 
Jasanoff articulates a social construction model that outlines the problems of objectivity and 
neutrality in science policy and how science became increasingly vulnerable to the other 
actors in the network.  
Last but not least different organizations, agencies, individuals are acting at different stages 
of a disastrous event, ranging from pre-impact to emergency and recovery. 
Despite those severe limitations, the four-group classification has served as a rough 
instrument to advance in the understanding of what knowledge is relevant for whom, to 
what extent it is shared and managed across groups and within each group. 
Knowledge management across stakeholders and social groups 
along the disaster cycle in twelve case studies analysed by the 
know-4-drr project 
Twelve case studies (table 1) spanning over ten countries have been analysed in the know-
4-drr project to understand what have been the major issues in data, information, and 
knowledge production, knowledge fragmentation or sharing among stakeholders across 
spatial and temporal scales. 
It may be interesting to examine how some of the countries to which the case studies 
pertain have reported on the advancement achieved thanks to HFA 1. Out of ten, six 
countries have complied with the requirement to provide such an assessment in the period 
2011-2013. Regarding the indicator of concern, all countries except for Germany responded 
positively to the following questions: b. whether information is proactively disseminated, 
whether there are established mechanisms for dissemination, whether information is 
provided by proactive guidance. To the first question, related to the existence of a disaster 
information system publicly available, Italy responded “no”, whilst all other countries 
including Germany responded “yes”. More interesting are perhaps the detailed narrative that 
accompany the key indicators. Germany suggests that much has still to be done in 
coordinating the various stakeholders and in making them share information across 
governmental levels. This is in line with what has been observed in the Elbe case study, 
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where several problems of information exchange, particularly in the very first days of the 
emergency, were reported between the local, regional and federal levels. Similarly Italy 
pointed at the too varied situation differentiating the existence, quality and access to 
information in different regions. France reported to be rather advanced on the issue of 
information sharing and dissemination: a local information system available for all citizens 
and the Gaspar database regarding disasters that occur each year have been developed. 
Since 2006 disclosure of hazard information is mandatory in the real estate sector; finally in 
the HFA1 Progress Report, France highlights the newly established National Observatory for 
Natural Hazards (ONRN) platform. Mexico has set within the Civil protection institution 
(CENAPRED) a virtual library of the Mexican system of civil protection regarding all issues 
related to risks and disasters. Similarly to the Gaspar database, a report is published annually 
reporting occurred disasters, including their socio-economic impact. 
A three dimensional framework has been developed as represented in figure 2 to compare 
and analyse the case studies. The framework is structured by disaster phases (distinguished 
between pre-impact mitigation, early warning and preparedness to an imminent event, 
emergency, recovery and reconstruction in the x axe), according to the components of the 
knowledge pyramid (ranging from data to knowledge as shown in the y axe), and by 
stakeholders groups (in the z axe). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 : Case studies examined in the first deliverable of the Know-4-DRR project 
 
 
Case Study Site Type of  hazard Date Brief description of the case study
Umbria, Italy Flood event
Nov. 
2012
The event striking Umbria on November 2012, starting on the 12th and ending on the 16th, depending on 
exact location and river basin, was the consequence of a widespread high intensity storm. The latter 
provoked floods and landslides in large zones in Central Italy, including besides Umbria also the Lazio and 
the Toscana Region, totalling 250 million Euros first order costs covering emergency response, recovery of 
infrastructures and first response to restart economic activities and public services (such as schools). The 
case study reports in particular the post-event damage assessment activity.
Ilia, Greece Forest fires
August 
2007
The synergistic effect of fuel accumulation and weather conditions can explain the occurrence of the large 
and catastrophic wildfires of 2007 in Peloponnesus. In the period between the 24th -28th  August 2007, the 
Ilia Province faced the most serious forest fire problem of all areas in Greece. Tens of losses of human lives 
and 6.000 homeless people; 168 municipal districts or 1.994 km2 declared as disaster areas -i.e. a territory 
representing 76% of the total area of the Prefecture; tens of thousands of hectares of burnt forest land 
representing 39% of the total forest land of the Prefecture.
Kalamata, Greece Earthquake
Sept. 
1986
On September 13th 1986, at 20:24 local time, the city of Kalamata (Southern Greece) and the surrounding 
villages were devastated by a shock of a Ms=6.0. Out of 9,800 inspected buildings, 22% had collapsed or 
were damaged beyond repair, 21% suffered heavy structural damages and 26% light structural damages.  In 
the historic centre around the Castle about two thirds of the buildings suffered damage beyond repair and 
about 80% of historic buildings and monuments were severely damaged. Substantial steps forward in 
earthquake protection policies and practices well as in reconstruction policies followed the Kalamata 
disaster. 
Greece Sea level rise
Recent 
past – 
present 
and 
future
The Greek coastal zone has a total length of approximately 16,200 km, being one of the longest coastal 
zones among European countries.The risk of coastal flooding is  limited, however, during December 2009-
January 2010, the coastal areas of the South-eastern Aegean islands were severely flooded (up to 1 m. Sea 
Level Rise is estimated to be in the range of 0/+1 mm/year, if only trends and rates of eustatic SLR are 
considered. Most big urban centre and economic activities are located on or nearby the Greek coasts, 
including about 80% of industrial activities, 90% of tourism and recreation, and 35% of agriculture, fisheries.
Lorca, Spain Lorca earthquake May 2011
The Lorca earthquake on 11th May 2011 M 5.2 at 18:47 was preceded by a M 4.0 foreshock at 17:05. It caused 
9 fatalities and more than 300 injured. 1164 buildings were seriously damaged. Damage concentrated in 
several areas in the city where around 40% of buildings were damaged. In the historical centre of Lorca 
around 16% of buildings were affected. Historical heritage was severely affected, including old churches 
and medieval wall towers. A year later, on the 28th of September 2012, Lorca was affected by flooding.
Elbe catchment, 
Germany
Flood event
August 
2002
The combination of heavy rainfall and sealed surfaces resulted in one of the most disastrous flood events 
ever observed in the Elbe region, between the 11th  and 13th of August 2002. The flood severely affected 
eight European countries; the case study has analysed the impact and the response in Germany. Along the 
main river course of the Elbe, 21 dike breaches occurred, inundating more than 300 km² and affecting, 
amongst other things, more than 25,000 residential buildings. 21 people were killed. Economic losses 
amounted to more than 11 billion Euros in Germany alone.  
Salzach 
catchment, 
Austria
Flood event
June 
2013
In June 2013, a 100 year return period flood affected large areas of Austria and Germany. The water gauge in 
Salzburg City measured 8.51 meters and was thus 15 cm higher than the catastrophic floods of 2002. The 
floods had a major effect on transportation networks, although the total damage was much less than in 
2002. This has to do with mitigation measures implemented since then. Although major advances to DRR 
have been made in recent times, and Salzburg Province can be regarded as a forerunner of successful DRM, 
there are still many areas in need of improvement. In June 2013 what did not function as expected was the 
early warning provided to citizens.  
La Faute sur Mer, 
France
Xynthia storm 
surge
Feb. 
2010
In February 2010, the French Atlantic coast was hit by storm Xynthia, causing over forty fatalities and direct 
losses of more than 2.5 billion Euros. Total public expenditure amounted to 467 million Euros; insurance pay-
outs came to 690 million Euros to cover damaged infrastructure. The municipalities of La Faute-sur-Mer, 
L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer, and La Tranche-sur-Mer (Vendée department) suffered severe damage. Among the 
reasons contributing  to the fatal impacts:  resistance of communities to adopt risk prevention plans, 
uncontrolled spatial planning as concerns flood risk management, lack of maintenance and failure of risk 
defence measures, and inappropriate risk considerations by the real estate market. 
Alpine Area
Climate change 
adaptation
Recent 
past – 
present , 
future
The effects of climate change and the induced hazards, such as avalanches, landslides, flash floods, and 
forest fires, are very evident in the Alpine area. The process of adaptation in the area, which is shared by 
different European countries is the object of some projects, and in particular the results of the the ongoing 
C3- Alps interreg project are reported in the case study.
Central Vietnam Typhoon events
2006 and 
2009
Vietnamese coastal areas are prone to tropical storms/cyclones every year (average 5-7), but at the time of 
Xangsane (2006), Chanchu (2006) and Ketsana (2009) typhoons, the capacity of preparedness and warning 
was low. In May 2006, the Cyclone Chanchu that developed in the China Sea on an east-west track hit the 
Vietnemete Province of Quang Nam, provoking severe damage. The number of destroyed houses was 
reported as 15,200, after having been downsized by public authority in a first estimate. In 2012-2013, the 
Ministry of Construction launched the Programme 716 to support families to build safe and resistant shelter 
in high flood areas, with the support of DWF (Dipecho funding project).
Padang, West 
Sumatra, 
Indonesia
Tsunami event
Dec. 
2004
After the Indian Ocean Tsunami event in December 2004, the city of Padang, West Sumatra, Indonesia, was 
one point of concern, due to its important seismic hazard potential and the dense population and 
infrastructure of its low-lying coastal areas. The scientific project that was used as a basis for this case study 
focused on the conditions at the community and household levels that determine their response to the 
early warning and capability of conducting evacuation, and addressed the topic of how urban planning may 
contribute to enhance this capacity. 
Mexico Stan hurricane Oct. 2005
The Stan tropical storm hit Mexico between the 3rd and 6th October 2005. It cause extended damage, 
particularly on infrastructures in different states, however the most severe damage was suffered in 
Chiapas. In the cities of Tapchula dn Motozintla floods occurred, affecting various neighbourhoods. In 
Chiapas the Stan tropical storm caused 86 deaths and more than 490.5 million UDS, representing about 40% 
of total damage recorded in Mexico.
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Table 1 – cont. : Case studies examined in the first deliverable of Know-4-DRR project 
 
Results of the performed analysis will not be described in detail, rather the following 
questions will be discussed: whether or not knowledge that is produced by different 
stakeholders group is useful or not; if knowledge is shared among stakeholders within and 
across the identified groups; if knowledge is enacted and decisions actually implemented.   
 
 
Case Study Site Type of  hazard Date Brief description of the case study
Lorca, Spain Lorca earthquake May 2011
The Lorca earthquake on 11th May 2011 M 5.2 at 18:47 was preceded by a M 4.0 foreshock at 17:05. It caused 
9 fatalities and more than 300 injured. 1164 buildings were seriously damaged. Damage concentrated in 
several areas in the city where around 40% of buildings were damaged. In the historical centre of Lorca 
around 16% of buildings were affected. Historical heritage was severely affected, including old churches 
and medieval wall towers. A year later, on the 28th of September 2012, Lorca was affected by flooding.
Elbe catchment, 
Germany
Flood event
August 
2002
The combination of heavy rainfall and sealed surfaces resulted in one of the most disastrous flood events 
ever observed in the Elbe region, between the 11th  and 13th of August 2002. The flood severely affected 
eight European countries; the case study has analysed the impact and the response in Germany. Along the 
main river course of the Elbe, 21 dike breaches occurred, inundating more than 300 km² and affecting, 
amongst other things, more than 25,000 residential buildings. 21 people were killed. Economic losses 
amounted to more than 11 billion Euros in Germany alone.  
Salzach 
catchment, 
Austria
Flood event
June 
2013
In June 2013, a 100 year return period flood affected large areas of Austria and Germany. The water gauge in 
Salzburg City measured 8.51 meters and was thus 15 cm higher than the catastrophic floods of 2002. The 
floods had a major effect on transportation networks, although the total damage was much less than in 
2002. This has to do with mitigation measures implemented since then. Although major advances to DRR 
have been made in recent times, and Salzburg Province can be regarded as a forerunner of successful DRM, 
there are still many areas in need of improvement. In June 2013 what did not function as expected was the 
early warning provided to citizens.  
La Faute sur Mer, 
France
Xynthia storm 
surge
Feb. 
2010
In February 2010, the French Atlantic coast was hit by storm Xynthia, causing over forty fatalities and direct 
losses of more than 2.5 billion Euros. Total public expenditure amounted to 467 million Euros; insurance pay-
outs came to 690 million Euros to cover damaged infrastructure. The municipalities of La Faute-sur-Mer, 
L’Aiguillon-sur-Mer, and La Tranche-sur-Mer (Vendée department) suffered severe damage. Among the 
reasons contributing  to the fatal impacts:  resistance of communities to adopt risk prevention plans, 
uncontrolled spatial planning as concerns flood risk management, lack of maintenance and failure of risk 
defence measures, and inappropriate risk considerations by the real estate market. 
Alpine Area
Climate change 
adaptation
Recent 
past – 
present , 
future
The effects of climate change and the induced hazards, such as avalanches, landslides, flash floods, and 
forest fires, are very evident in the Alpine area. The process of adaptation in the area, which is shared by 
different European countries is the object of some projects, and in particular the results of the the ongoing 
C3- Alps interreg project are reported in the case study.
Central Vietnam Typhoon events
2006 and 
2009
Vietnamese coastal areas are prone to tropical storms/cyclones every year (average 5-7), but at the time of 
Xangsane (2006), Chanchu (2006) and Ketsana (2009) typhoons, the capacity of preparedness and warning 
was low. In May 2006, the Cyclone Chanchu that developed in the China Sea on an east-west track hit the 
Vietnemete Province of Quang Nam, provoking severe damage. The number of destroyed houses was 
reported as 15,200, after having been downsized by public authority in a first estimate. In 2012-2013, the 
Ministry of Construction launched the Programme 716 to support families to build safe and resistant shelter 
in high flood areas, with the support of DWF (Dipecho funding project).
Padang, West 
Sumatra, 
Indonesia
Tsunami event
Dec. 
2004
After the Indian Ocean Tsunami event in December 2004, the city of Padang, West Sumatra, Indonesia, was 
one point of concern, due to its important seismic hazard potential and the dense population and 
infrastructure of its low-lying coastal areas. The scientific project that was used as a basis for this case study 
focused on the conditions at the community and household levels that determine their response to the 
early warning and capability of conducting evacuation, and addressed the topic of how urban planning may 
contribute to enhance this capacity. 
Mexico Stan hurricane Oct. 2005
The Stan tropical storm hit Mexico between the 3rd and 6th October 2005. It cause extended damage, 
particularly on infrastructures in different states, however the most severe damage was suffered in 
Chiapas. In the cities of Tapchula dn Motozintla floods occurred, affecting various neighbourhoods. In 
Chiapas the Stan tropical storm caused 86 deaths and more than 490.5 million UDS, representing about 40% 
of total damage recorded in Mexico.
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Image 2 :  Framework adopted for the analysis of the case studies 
 
Is knowledge produced by different stakeholders group useful? 
Most reflections provided in literature rotate around the question whether or not knowledge 
produced by “scientists” is useful and usable by other stakeholders. The same know-4-drr 
project answers a call asking why knowledge that is available in drr and cc is not reaching 
decision and policy makers. Already in the project proposal, the idea that knowledge is a 
“commodity” out there to be transferred from one community to another has been 
challenged, suggesting that the key question to be asked is another one, that is what are the 
conditions at which produced knowledge is used and usable, by whom and how it can be 
better shared, produced and co-produced. This way the question of whether or not produced 
knowledge is useful incorporates also the question of whether or not it is sufficiently shared.  
More specifically, it can be stated that scientists have progressed significantly in 
understanding many aspects related to hazards, including their interconnectedness and the 
possibility to have enchained and cascading natural and technological incidents. Components 
of the risk function, like vulnerability and resilience, rather neglected in the past, have gained 
significant room in the last decades. Tools for measuring and assessing vulnerability and 
resilience of assets and communities in practice have been developed.  
Steps towards operationalization of concepts like vulnerability and resilience are crucial for 
both achieving usable knowledge and for sharing it across stakeholders groups. Being able to 
map vulnerability for the private sectors, as perceived by local communities is as crucial as 
providing assessments for regional and local governments with the responsibility to act 
according to such assessments.  
mitigation 
before impact
pre-impact
preparedness
impact emergency recovery reconstruction
data
information
knowledge
wisdom
knowledge
pyramid
disaster 
phases
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Progress has been made in identifying problems that hinder the use of vulnerability and 
resilience ‘knowledge’. This includes difficulties of developing consensus on the 
methodologies used by different stakeholders; slow delivery of products that could enhance 
resilience to change, and the time-consuming process of coming to a negotiated 
understanding in science-practice interactions Vogel et al. (2007). The KNOW-4-DRR project 
confirms these problems, but also provides evidence that knowledge sharing is taking place, 
in particular at the: 
 a. local level between scientists and responsibilities with regard to data acquisition and 
improvement;  
b. national level between different responsibilities and administration units with regard to the 
use of scientific data; and  
c. international level between specific groups of scientists and actors with regard to the 
development of mitigation activities (Kienberger et al. 2013).  
The analysis carried out for the twelve case studies highlighted that the different 
stakeholders groups are not equally active across the disaster phases. For example scientists 
are more active in the mitigation and in the recovery phase, whilst their contribution in the 
imminence of a disaster or in the emergency is far less pronounced.  
Usability of knowledge depends on the phase and on the actors that are considered: a total 
co-sharing and participation of all stakeholders in all phases is unrealistic as for the present 
situation. However, what clearly emerges from the case studies and reinforces what has 
been already discussed in literature, is that co-production across stakeholders group has the 
highest possibility of successful outcomes, as the demands and the supply of knowledge 
from both sides are compared, understood and eventually met (Sarewitz and Pielke, 2007). 
For example, in the case of scientists working together with public administration officers in 
damage recording in the aftermath of a disaster, analytical and descriptive frameworks 
produced by scientists are tuned to the knowledge regarding procedures and processes to be 
followed in order to achieve a certain result (compensation to victims and restoration of 
normal conditions for life and work) that are hold by governmental bodies.  
In fact, in the recovery and the reconstruction phase a far greater number of bridges 
facilitating knowledge sharing have been identified in the case studies, as the event acts as a 
catalyst (Elbe, Stan, Umbria, and Lorca). Specific funds were allocated for dedicated 
programmes on Risk Management Knowledge (Elbe, Stan, Umbria) including the 
development of knowledge for the improvement of the management procedures or 
establishing different stakeholder partnerships (university-scientists - civil society)  that 
volunteer to conduct studies (Ilia). After the 2007 fires, the Greek General Directorate of 
Development and Protection of Forests and Natural Environment worked in co-operation with 
international specialists to address post-fire impacts and to protect burnt areas from 
secondary effects such as landslides and floods.   
Automated procedures for data assessment, use of new information and communication 
technologies (ICT) in early-warning systems, establishing improved procedures of 
communication in all reporting during the emergency phase, and interlinking scientists and 
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administrative personnel in advisory committees and joint research programmes have been 
witnessed in the quoted case studies.  
An incremental body of literature has been dealing with vernacular and local knowledge hold 
by communities about risks and evidences of climate change, as this knowledge is very 
context specific and sometimes more relevant than highly formalized but detached from 
context science produced in laboratories. Whilst some case studies suggest that participation 
of citizens and local groups to the development of knowledge is important for overcoming 
lack of mutual comprehension and understanding of the implications of forecasts and norms, 
others show also that vernacular knowledge is today challenged by both natural and social 
factors. As for natural ones, fast changing environmental conditions are threatening what 
has been learnt for generations; as for social factors, rapidly evolving economic and market 
conditions are transforming habits and cultures, thus requiring new forms of adjustment and 
perhaps more sophisticated ways of knowing the context in which a community is living and 
operating.  
Is knowledge enacted? 
The case studies show that knowledge is enacted, but only partially, mostly in the aftermath 
of a disaster, and that the translation of what is known in what is decided and actually done 
not so straightforward. This has to do with the fact that mitigation is per se made of a set of 
different structural and non-structural measures. Selecting the best mix and combination of 
measures is not easy and requires a much higher degree of cooperation among actors and 
stakeholders than the current situation allows for.  
Measures that are enacted are often sectoral and piecemeal, reflecting the level of sharing 
and co-production of knowledge among the variety of organizations, agencies and individuals 
that have been recognized in section 2.  
Barriers that have been identified in the co-production and sharing of useful knowledge are 
somehow similar to the ones encountered in translating knowledge into practice, in 
conveying the information about how to implement a given decision. 
The enlargement of disaster-related research and the increase of scientific activities so far 
had little impact on reversing the upward trend in disaster damage, precisely expressed by 
White et al. (2001) as “knowing better and losing even more”. Obviously, there are gaps 
between what is known about disaster risks, on the one hand, and how research findings are 
translated into policies and programmes, on the other.  
In European hazard research, institutional and constitutional constraints are often ignored; 
social resilience and adaptive capacities are only poorly investigated and risk education as 
specific strategies of social capacity building is not highlighted (Kuhlicke et al. 2011). Deficits 
also exist with regard to practical applications of conceptual thinking in vulnerability 
assessment, operational methodologies relevant for and applicable by practitioners, concrete 
measures that address the systemic underlying causes of vulnerability, and assessing the 
substantial costs of implementing vulnerability reduction strategies (Newton and Weichsel-
gartner 2013). Existent scientific results and assessments of risks are frequently not used 
because they have been defined and framed to meet the needs of science rather than the 
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needs of those making decisions. Various studies point to different institutional settings and 
standards, differing cultural values, divergent understanding, and mistrust as critical factors 
hindering efficient transfer of knowledge into action (Weichselgartner and Kasperson 2010; 
Moser and Ekstrom 2010, Lövbrand 2011, Dilling and Lemos 2011).  
The prescriptive approach of postnormal science (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993) is particularly 
relevant for DRR and CCA since aspects of problem-solving are considered that were often 
neglected in traditional accounts of scientific practice: uncertainty, value-loading, and the 
plurality of legitimate perspectives. In these sorts of issue-driven science, particularly with 
regard to complex systems, “typically facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high, and 
decisions urgent” (ibid. 1993, p. 744). In such contexts, ‘normal science’ in the sense of 
Kuhn (1962) is not an adequate knowledge production mode, since the traditional scientific 
mindset fosters expectations of regularity, simplicity, and certainty. Where uncertainties are 
crucial, value-loadings critical, and less information available than desired by political 
decision-makers, there can be no single privileged perspective for measurement, analysis, 
and evaluation. Thus, invoking ‘truth’ as the goal of science is a distraction from real tasks. It 
is argued that quality is a more relevant and robust guiding principle – understood as a 
contextual property of scientific information. By bringing ‘facts’ and ‘values’ into a unified 
conception of problem-solving in these areas, and by replacing ‘truth’ with ‘quality’ as its core 
evaluative concept, postnormal scientific practice provides a framework for extended 
participation in decision-making and a path to the democratisation of science.  
Among bridges that can facilitate the sharing and co-production of knowledge the existence 
of organizations and individuals that are able to build and provide interfaces are often cited 
and identified in the twelve case studies. Pracademics, boundary organizations working with 
and between scientists and public administrations, public and private sectors, academia and 
NGOs or citizens groups are indicated as examples of bridges that may work and have 
actually worked well in some cases. A relevant example of boundary organization is provided 
by the French ONRN case. The latter is a unique public-private-civil as well as societal-
academic partnership agreement that was signed in May 2012 by major stakeholders, 
including State Authorities, the Mayors Association, the Insurance Market Association, and 
the CCR (the Central Fund for Reinsurance). The ONRN is an example of what Godfrey et al. 
(2010, p.5) called “institutionalisation of knowledge brokering”: “establishment of new, 
closer and cooperative relationships between government, science and society actor clusters” 
(ibid., p. 1).  
The creation of bridges is not enough, though, incentives have to be given to cross and 
maintain them at various societal and territorial levels. Speaking about “pracademics” or 
about meetings and workshops for stakeholders of different groups to share and discuss 
together topics that are relevant to all, even though tackled in different ways and through 
different paradigms, specific conditions must be provided. For example, Ackoff (2006) was 
already complaining about the fact that in the board of scientific journals, practitioners and 
professionals are not present; academic reward is higher for incremental achievements 
regarding problems that are sometimes very marginal in the practical world (Posner, 2009), 
whilst the fuzzy and inevitably spurred results of the co-work of mixed scientists and 
practitioners, or of scientists with different disciplinary backgrounds are often labeled as 
lacking rigour and not meeting “scientific standards”.  
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On the other side, actors of public administrations as well as of private businesses may see 
as a waste of time contributing to workshops or meetings with academics. In this regard, it 
may well be that the financial crisis that some European countries are facing may provide 
some positive incentives. In fact, as public administrations and governments shrink due to 
budget constraints, the need to be more efficient, adopting a framework to address the 
search of data and the production of information becomes more evident and pushes 
practitioners and officers to look for methodological frameworks produced by and in 
conjunction with scientists.   
Examples of production and co-production of useful and usable knowledge can be found 
among the Know-4-drr case studies. After the Lorca earthquake, the Murcia Regional 
Administration prepared a brochure compiling all available actions for recovering economic 
activities, that constituted an important tool for informing and mobilising the public. 
After the Kalamata earthquake, various studies and research projects explored a wide range 
of aspects relating to earthquake protection from engineering and planning to social aspects. 
The outcome of the scientific studies and research projects was not simply more knowledge 
in various fields. Of far greater significance is the connection that was developed between 
different disciplines dealing with the Kalamata earthquake disaster and individuals involved in 
the reconstruction of Kalamata through different roles and positions (field studies, 
consulting, usability and damage inspections, emergency response, issuing building and 
repair permits, supervision of the construction of infrastructure works, control and design of 
reconstruction of the historic centre and of historic buildings, management of transitional 
housing etc). This created a basis for communication and exchange that functions even 
today. In this way, common experiences in a disaster situation have created a bridge 
between various disciplines and different roles that could be maintained overtime. 
Learning, unlearning, and innovating in DRR in integration to 
CCA 
Knowledge management systems prove to work if individuals and organizations are able not 
only to share and maintain relevant information and knowledge but also to acquire new 
knowledge by learning and innovating. Learning takes place also when stakeholders share 
their knowledge as by doing so they create the opportunity to learn from each other. 
Learning must occur at a much larger scale, as knowledge is by definition dynamic, growing 
on the shoulders of previous achievements and discoveries. Even though there are 
similarities between the way individuals and organizations learn, there are also fundamental 
differences, given that within an organization learning is not just the result of summed 
individual efforts, but is also the integrated outcome of a collective effort. In the field of 
disaster risk, there are many organizations and entities involved and also what needs to be 
learnt is not straightforwardly defined. In fact, when new knowledge is available regarding 
given hazards or on the way risks are assessed, new facts and methodologies must be 
acquired.  
However not just learning about facts and new methods or tools are of use for organizations, 
but also regarding how things are done within the organizations and in concert with others. 
In particular, the management of prevention strategies and of crises requires significant 
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learning about how things are done or could be done better. Actually when talking about 
“lessons learnt” from past disasters what is generally referred to are lessons about 
behaviours, conducts, tools that could have been used or managed better than actually 
occurred. However, what the twelve case studies of the project suggest is that a much more 
complex type of knowledge is required in order to face the challenges related to disaster risk 
and potential effects of climate change. In fact, organizations, individuals, citizens would 
need a much more complex and rich level of learning, including how things need to be done, 
about new facts, about new, and more elaborated ways of understanding, assessing and 
analyzing risks. Even the apparently “simple” task of collecting data in the aftermath of a 
disaster has proved to be much more difficult and requiring much more knowledge, 
understanding and expertise than suspected, as we have mentioned at the beginning of this 
paper. This task entails the recognition of the different uses and purposes for which data 
collection is carried out and requires a new type of collaboration among the different 
agencies that have direct responsibility and also indirect interest, like universities and 
research centres. The Umbria and the Salzach case studies provide a relevant example in 
this regard. 
The learning process within organizations, and specifically within organizations with 
responsibilities in disaster risk has been studied for long time and from different angles 
(Roux-Dufort, 2000; Guilhou and Lagadec, 2000;  Pahl-Wostl, 2009). Studies on the issue 
suggest that learning is not necessarily cumulative and progressive, as there may well be 
steps forward and backward and whilst new things are learnt and introduced in the routine 
of organisations, some other, even crucial, are forgotten and lost. As correctly put in the 
European Commission Report (2007) Taking European Knowledge Society Seriously, «the 
development of a body of knowledge is usually accompanied by a corresponding process of 
‘unlearning’ other forms of knowledge. Even if these are not in equal measure, what is lost 
can be important. Likewise as knowledge is acquired, new forms of ignorance are also 
created, or mobilized».  
When talking about learning and innovating in the field of disaster risk management, the 
possibility of unlearning, or forgetting has to be kept in mind. Many times what is presented 
as real novelty is in fact re-discovery of concepts and tools that were already at hand in the 
past. This occurs also as a result of the fragmentation of knowledge mentioned above. 
Notions like “resilience” for example are not new even though sometimes considered such in 
recent debates on disaster risk. In fact, as well described in Norris et al (2008), resilience as 
understood in the field of disasters owes a lot to the same concepts as used in psychiatry 
and psychology since several decades. The lack of dialogue between scientists and 
practitioners in the fields of disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation and 
mitigation may open the floor for significant possibilities of unlearning or ignoring knowledge 
that has been already produced and that can be of significant use in both domains (Mercer, 
2010; Tearfund, 2008). 
Referring to innovation what is meant is often the introduction of new tools and in particular 
of new technologies. The same idea of knowledge management systems in the form of 
platform to facilitate access to and sharing of relevant pieces of knowledge is made possible 
by the significant changes the new media, the cloud computing and storage facilities offer. 
However, new technologies can be used in old ways, without actually innovating how things 
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are done or the content of what is stored. In this regard, the “risk communication” and to a 
larger extent the “science communication” is still in its infancy. Despite large volumes written 
on the topic, too often authorities are reluctant to inform citizens about existing risks in their 
neighborhoods, getting to the harsh contradiction highlighted by Parker in Mitchell (1999): 
on the one hand it is stated that citizens are the primary response line in case of disasters 
but on the other they are not given the right information ahead in the fear they will panic or 
react against the authorities who have informed them.  
In a similar fashion also the capacity of scientists to disseminate the results of their projects 
and research is still very limited and narrowly understood as presenting to conferences or 
publishing in a refereed journal. Whilst the European Commission has reinforced 
progressively the requirement to disseminate the results of project granted European funds 
and to have an “impact”, it is still too little understood what “having an impact” really means. 
In the know-4-drr project an attempt is being carried out to work with professionals in the 
field of communication, working for web-tv and a national radio, to understand how project’s 
results need to be communicated to the external world, by diversifying the messages and the 
key arguments tuning them to a rather differentiated panel of potential audiences, that are 
much more articulated than the four stakeholders groups identified initially in project 
proposal. What professionals of the communication sector are telling us is that old and new 
media must be understood in their potential, in their functioning, so as to provide a valid 
bridge across different communities to permit actual sharing of relevant knowledge and 
information. In some of our case studies significant advancement in the way risks and 
impacts are communicated have been achieved. 
For example, in Vietnam, since the 2006 and 2009 typhoon disasters, information provided 
by TV and radio has improved with detailed warning. TV documentaries about how to 
prepare for disasters were also broadcast. Improvements were made to the information 
delivery on the websites by the local and national civil protection authorities. The media has 
been trained in the past five years to increase the capacity to deliver relevant information 
before and after disaster events. 
The National Centre of Disaster Prevention (CENAPRED) in Mexico published a socio-
economic study showing information about hurricane Stan: cost, numbers of communities 
affected, infrastructure, roads etc. To improve the transfer of information across institutions 
and borders, the provinces (Länder) in Germany established a common early warning 
website. 
Finally, as suggested by various authors (Pahl-Wostl, 2009), innovation is pursued by 
changing organizational procedures and processes. However, a couple of points deserve 
further discussion. The first is the need to balance innovation with stability: innovation can 
take place only against practices and procedures that are kept stable in the fore or in the 
background and in the meantime enough time needs to be allocated for verifying the results 
of introduced changes. In this respect, it has to be reminded that significant changes in 
organizations will take at least a decade to become apparent and provide results, whist often 
issues are brought to the front line in much shorter time, that is measurable by years if not 
less (Lee, 1993). This creates a very strong tension between the requirement for innovation 
and change and the actual possibility and opportunity to provide for change; a situation that 
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may lead either to immobility (there is no need for change if the latter is already old by the 
time it has been introduced in the organization) or to chaos (it cannot be that everything 
changes all the time without any control about the results of the changes that have been 
introduced). 
In this regard an increasing literature is proposing the need for more “adaptive” 
organizations (McLain and Lee, 1996), that are flexible enough to provide room for 
experiments that will provide the opportunity to test changes and innovative practices.  
Conclusions: proposing a more comprehensive interpretation of 
informational and knowledge needs in HFA2 
In the HFA 1 the third general priority for action is aimed at “Using knowledge, innovation 
and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels” identifying four sub.-
areas: information management and exchange, education and training, research, an public 
education. From the reflections and discussions carried out to build the Knw-4-drr proposal 
and the first deliverables, a more dynamic view of knowledge is arising, one in which 
different stakeholders groups should attempt build together a common vision and 
understanding about risks and ways to cope with them more effectively. In HFA 1 it is still 
assumed that research is going to provide the answers to most questions, and then the 
matter is how to disseminate and share with others the results of experiments carried out in 
laboratories or of assessments developed on the base of sophisticated modeling. Even 
though interdisciplinary work is considered essential, little emphasis is given on the fact that 
a much larger cooperation among different scientific communities, even among those that 
are only loosely connected to risks and hazards should be pursued, so as to make results 
obtained in resource management, in adaptive ecological management, in sustainability 
science flow and inform also disaster related sciences. Little if anything is mentioned about 
the need to strengthen the links between the disaster and the climate change communities, 
who until now have made just few and hesitant attempts to share and integrated 
methodologies and concepts on risks, vulnerability, coping capacity, adaptive capacity, 
resilience. Yet this situation is not helpful in a condition where governments may be asked to 
shrink because of budget constraints and the same officers are responsible of both risk 
mitigation strategies and climate change adaptation.  
A more dynamic perspective of how knowledge is produced, shared and eventually co-
produced, requires to abandon the idea of “knowledge transfer”, but rather to enhance the 
cooperation and the coordination capacity among different stakeholders and social groups, 
particularly when they are working in the same geographical context on the same problems. 
Also the reference to more user friendly instruments to allow for the treatment and the 
dissemination of maps and data has to be rethought of in the light of web 2.0 and perhaps in 
a near future web 3.0 technologies. The digital earth concept (Craglia et al., 2008), the 
experiences carried out in Haiti (Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, 2011) demonstrate that 
unexpected forms of co-production of knowledge may emerge using the potential of internet 
based technologies. Yet how to design effective forms of web based knowledge and 
information co-production and sharing is still a matter to be explored and much better 
understood. For example maps embed knowledge, they represent thematic features that 
derive from analyses and assessments. To draw maps and use at best the potentialities of 
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GIS knowledge and capacities are required too. If the possibilities provided by interactive 
mapping on web platforms are added, even larger capacities and knowledge are required. 
And it is not just a matter of skilled computer scientists interviewing “domain” experts for 
eliciting requirements: such traditional view seems somehow outmoded in the light of the 
many limitations that tools developed insofar have encountered (Harvard Humanitarian 
Initiative, 2011). 
In the same vein any attempt to improve statistical analysis of disasters and disaster risk 
related data requires that knowledge exists and is shared between data providers and users 
regarding what are the relevant indicators to survey and monitor. Before databases are 
made public and open, there must be a clear understanding regarding what are the 
objectives to be achieved, in line with the current reflection discussed in the introduction to 
this paper. 
Knowledge related issues, however are not confined to the third priority action area; instead 
they encompass the entire Hyogo Framework. There is the need to enhance knowledge 
regarding effective and successful governance tools to address the complementary 
challenges of “sustainable development, poverty, disaster risk reduction”. Knowing what 
works and what does not in which context goes far beyond a list of “best” or “good” 
practices, it requires that procedures and processes of bureaucracies and institutions be 
correctly understood, particularly if changes have to be proposed. As discussed in the paper 
the emphasis should not be only on the identification of the problems and on establishing a 
decision making process to address them, but also on how implementation, compliance with 
norms and decisions can be achieved. Knowledge on organisations’ behavior, on states and 
institutions functioning is required not less than knowledge about the variables characterizing 
hazards, exposure, and vulnerabilities. Actually, institutions and bureaucracy can provide 
both weak, maladaptive and strong and positive responses to environmental stresses. 
We suggest that knowledge management is actually needed in all key areas for action of 
HFA 1. In particular, regarding the second priority line, “Identify, assess and monitor disaster 
risks and enhance early warning”, our analysis of the twelve case studies suggests that 
knowledge is required to produce risk assessments tailored for different purposes, such as 
early warning. Knowledge about the stakeholders involved in the process, about their way of 
working, about the exposed systems, about the specificities of the context within which 
assessments are developed. 
Similarly, regarding the different measures to be taken to reduce risk factors as described in 
the fourth key set of actions, experience has shown that embedding the results of research 
and/or risk assessments in mitigation strategies or in what could become risk mitigation 
strategies has been rather ineffective. For example, land use planners are simply unable to 
embed risk mitigation as they often lack even fundamental understanding of hazards 
dynamics and cannot figure out the potential impact of hazards in the territory they are 
planning. What would be needed is therefore a much deeper consideration of how 
practitioners and scientists with different background and often acting in different forums 
can together develop or at least share understanding of risk assessments results fitting 
specific needs. 
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As suggested by McGlade and van den Hove (2013, p. 415): “It is unsurprising that planning 
and management institutions have been unable to respond to crises or change, as in many 
instances, the organizations are suffering from a chaotic mix of information, analysis and 
interpretation with not paradigmatic structure in which to incorporate all the various forms of 
scientific, interdisciplinary, and indigenous knowledge. In the pre-modern environment, 
knowledge was rich and adapted to the requirements of living locally. Individuals today are 
just as knowledgeable but they receive information from an enormous number of sources, 
some technical, some cultural. In this way we can see a form of second-order science 
emerging in which individuals must rely on other peer groups and experts to be able to 
evaluate the information within their own domains of expertise”. The latter condition, so well 
described by McGlade and van den Hove requires that new forms of cooperation and 
coordination of knowledge be encouraged and developed. 
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